On firm-level, industry-level, and aggregate employment fluctuations by Casares Polo, Miguel
 Departamento de Economía 
 
Ekonomia Saila 
Documentos de Trabajo 
 
Lan Gaiak 
ON FIRM-LEVEL, INDUSTRY-LEVEL, AND AGGREGATE 
EMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS 
Miguel Casares 
D.T. 1309 
On ﬁrm-level, industry-level, and aggregate
employment ﬂuctuations
Miguel Casares∗
Universidad Pública de Navarra
July 5th, 2013
Abstract
Employment ﬂuctuations are examined, at diﬀerent levels of aggregation, in a dynamic model
that provides ﬁrm-speciﬁc hiring decisions due to search frictions and sticky pricing. The re-
sults indicate that ﬁrm-level employment dispersion rises with higher price stickiness and higher
demand elasticity, whereas it falls with more convexity of search costs and with a higher labor
supply elasticity. Industry-level employment is more volatile and less procyclical than aggregate
employment, and a larger industry size reduces volatility and raises co-movement with output.
The calibrated model is able to match the volatility, autocorrelation and cyclical correlation of
US industry-level employment when incorporating ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks.
Keywords: employment ﬂuctuations, search frictions, sticky prices, ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
JEL codes: E3, J2, J3, and J4.
1 Introduction
Search frictions and unemployment have been recently introduced in dynamic macroeconomic models
that assume homogeneous employment in the labor market (Walsh, 2005; Trigari, 2009; Blanchard
and Galí, 2010). Such representative-agent models do not seem to be compatible with a search-and-
matching theory of unemployment a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Firm diﬀerentiation might
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be required to explain why workers become eventually ﬁred while others are able to ﬁnd a new job by
ﬁlling a vacancy posting.1 In other words, the endogenous determination of employment dynamics
ought to be ﬁrm speciﬁc.
Hence, this paper describes a model with search frictions and unemployment that contemplates
heterogeneous employment.2 The key model ingredients are monopolistically competitive ﬁrms as in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), sticky prices a la Calvo (1983), and a labor market with search frictions of
the Mortensen-Pissarides style. Firm-level employment dynamics can be determined as a combined
response to price rigidities and search frictions when pricing and hiring decisions are connected at the
optimizing program of the ﬁrm. In turn, ﬁrms diﬀerentiate in many dimensions: they have a speciﬁc
selling price, they have a diﬀerent number of employees, they oﬀer a particular number of vacancies,
they produce a diﬀerent quantity of output, they organize diﬀerent shifts of hours at work, and they
pay a diﬀerent nominal wage. Industry-level employment ﬂuctuations are obtained as the average
across the set of ﬁrms that belong to one industry. Finally, aggregate employment ﬂuctuations are
governed by a dynamic equation similar to the one derived in the models with search frictions and
unemployment cited above.
The empirical evidence indicate that ﬁrm-level and industry-level ﬂuctuations are more volatile
than aggregate ﬂuctuations (Comin and Phillipon, 2005; Davis et al., 2007). Moreover, this volatility
divergence has risen in the last decades (Comin and Mulani, 2006).3 This paper contributes to explain
the determinants of higher employment volatility at disaggregated levels. In the calibrated model,
employment dispersion across ﬁrms rises with the degree of price rigidity, and the elasticity of demand
for consumption goods, and falls with an increase in the elasticity of the search cost function, and the
elasticity of substitution in the labor supply. In model simulations with alternative industry sizes,
business cycle statistics show an intense reduction of variability in the aggregation from ﬁrm-level
employment to industry-level employment. This reduction is much higher with a larger industry
1Quoting Davis et al. (2007), page 113: "Theories of unemployment based on search and matching frictions
(Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000)) rely on idiosyncratic shocks to drive job destruction and
match dissolution.".
2Other recent papers that describe a model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment are Sveen and Weinke (2008) and Thomas
(2011). The model of this paper diﬀers from these in the wage setting assumptions.
3Using recent US data released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, I report in the Appendix A that the standard
deviation of industry-level employment in the US has been 38.7% higher than the one of ﬂuctuations of total private
employment.
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size. The results of this paper also show that industry-level employment volatility is more volatile
and less procyclical than aggregate employment in both the calibrated model and US data.
However, the baseline model is not able to replicate the volatility gap because the standard devi-
ation of industry-level employment is less than 10% higher than the standard deviation of aggregate
employment, even in the case of a small industry size. Subsequently, the baseline model will be
modiﬁed to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks as another source of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The
simulation results will show that the calibrated model with idiosyncratic shocks is able to replicate
the volatility, cyclical correlation and inertia observed in US industry-level employment ﬂuctuations.
The rest of the paper contains four more sections. Section 2 describes the details and derivation of
the baseline model and oﬀers a calibration of its parameters. Section 3 examines the determinants of
the volatility observed in ﬁrm-level employment ﬂuctuations. Industry-level employment is deﬁned
in Section 4 and the eﬀects of the industrial size on the second-moment statistics of employment
ﬂuctuations are examined in the baseline model and in one variant that incorporates ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technology shocks. Section 5 reviews the main results.
2 A search-and-matching model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment
The supply-side of the economy is formed by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms of the type described
in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Thus, ﬁrms may set a speciﬁc price while the amount of output produced
is determined at the demand curve
yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt

−θp
yt, (1)
where yt(i) is output produced at the representative ﬁrm i, Pt(i)/Pt is the ratio of price set by
ﬁrm i over the aggregate price level, yt is aggregate output, and θp > 0.0 is a constant elasticity
parameter. In their production technology, ﬁrms have two forms of varying labor input: at the
extensive margin (number of workers employed, nt(i)), and in the intensive margin (number of hours
per worker demanded, hdt (i)). Assuming constant capital, and the same labor productivity in both
margins, the production function of the i ﬁrm is
yt(i) =

exp(zt)h
d
t (i)nt(i)
1−α
, (2)
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where 0 < α < 1, and zt denotes the economy-wide technology shock. After substituting (2) into
(1), the demand constraint faced by the i-th ﬁrm is
exp(zt)h
d
t (i)nt(i)
1−α
=

Pt(i)
Pt

−θp
yt. (3)
Wages are adjusted by the ﬁrm to equate total hours of labor supply and labor demand.4. Hence,
the nominal wage is the hourly rate that equates the willingness of workers to spend time at the ﬁrm
(supply of total hours) with the need of workhours for the ﬁrm (demand for total hours).5 For the
speciﬁc i ﬁrm, the demand for total hours is obtained by turning (3) around to yield
hdt (i)nt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt

−
θp
1−α y
1
1−α
t
exp(zt)
. (4)
Meanwhile, the supply of total hours is determined by solving the household optimizing program.
It is assumed that there is a representative large household as in Merz (1995). The members of
the household who are working pool their labor income to be split up evenly in a way that conveys
consumption insurance for the unemployed members. The representative household demands bundles
of diﬀerentiated consumption goods, ct, and supplies bundles of total hours of labor services, h
s
tnt.
Assuming constant elasticity of substitution á la Dixit-Stiglitz, the optimal allocation of total hours
supplied to the i-th ﬁrm is positively related to the relative wage, Wt(i)/Wt, as follows
hst (i)nt (i) =

Wt(i)
Wt
θw
hstnt, (5)
where θw > 0 is the labor supply elasticity of substitution.6 Using (4) and (5) to equate total hours
supplied and demanded at ﬁrm i, hdt (i)nt(i) = h
s
t (i)nt(i), and solving for the labor-clearing nominal
wage, Wt(i), it is obtained
7
Wt(i) =
Pt
c−σt
Pt(i)
Pt

−
θp
1−α y
1
1−α
t
exp(zt)
 1θw , (6)
4Alternatively, wages are deﬁned in a Nash-style bargaining setup in many papers of the Mortensen-Pissarides
literature (Walsh, 2005; Krause and Lubik, 2007; Christoﬀel and Kuester, 2008; and Trigari, 2009).
5The impossibility of instantaneous hiring obliges the ﬁrm to modify the amount of hours per worker, hdt (i), when
output must be adjusted to meet current demand conditions. The other inputs of the production function (2) cannot
be used to adjust the level of production because they are either exogenous (the technology shock, zt) or predetermined
(employment, nt(i)).
6See Casares (2007) for more details.
7Casares (2008) deﬁnes the labor-clearing nominal wage for hours per worker, hdt (i) = h
s
t (i), using a similar model
outline.
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which reveals that the nominal wage depends on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price, aﬀecting it negatively due to
the reduction in the demand for total hours (4). The ﬁrm i will take into account this relationship
between Wt(i) and Pt(i) in the optimizing program introduced below.
Next, let us describe the hiring decision. As in the search and matching literature (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994), hiring workers is costly for the ﬁrm. In particular, the ﬁrm must post a vacancy
in the market and wait for a matching of that vacancy with some unemployed worker. The search
cost of the i—th ﬁrm, c(vt(i)), is an increasing function of its number of vacancy postings, vt(i),
c(vt(i)) = c0 (vt(i))
1+c1 ,
where c0 > 0 is a scale parameter and c1 ≥ 0 is the elasticity of the marginal cost of posting a
vacancy with respect to the number of vacancies. The hiring process requires one period to ﬁll the
vacancy. Meanwhile, job destruction is determined by the constant separation rate, 0 < s < 1.8 As
a result, the employment accumulation equation for the i-th ﬁrm becomes
(1− s)nt(i) + vt(i)qt = nt+1(i), (7)
which implies that next period’s employment is the predetermined sum of the jobs that remain after
current period, (1 − s)nt(i), plus the number of new hirings, vt(i)qt, obtained as the product of
the number of vacancies posted by the probability qt of ﬁlling them with a match. The matching
probability is deﬁned by the aggregate matching rate for vacancies
qt =
mt
vt
,
where mt is the total number of matchings. The matching technology, strictly bounded between 0
and 1, as recommended by Den Haan et al. (2000) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), determines
these matchings as follows
mt =
utvt
uξt + v
ξ
t
1/ξ ,
where ξ > 0 and ut = 1− nt is the rate of unemployment.
The price setting decision of the ﬁrm is not separated from the hiring decision; both the price
and next-period employment are jointly determined in the solution of its optimizing program. Thus,
8Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) claim that the separation rate is quite stable in the US and has little eﬀect on
employment ﬂuctuations.
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the representative i ﬁrm seeks to maximize the intertemporal proﬁt function
Et
∞	
k=0
βt,t+k


Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
1−θp
yt+k −
Wt+k(i)
Pt+k
hdt+k(i)nt+k(i)− c0 (vt+k(i))1+c1

subject to constraints (3) and (7) in period t and future periods. Future proﬁts are discounted at the
stochastic discount factor βt,t+k for k = 1, 2, ...,∞. The ﬁrst order condition regarding the choice of
next-period employment nt+1(i) is
−Etβt,t+1
Wt+1(i)
Pt+1
hdt+1(i) +Etβt,t+1
∂yt+1(i)
∂nt+1(i)
ψt+1(i)− ϕt(i) +Etβt,t+1

(1− s)ϕt+1(i)

= 0, (8)
where ψt+1(i) and ϕt(i) are the Lagrange multipliers respectively attached to constraints (3) in period
t and (7) in their respective periods. The optimality condition on the demand for hours per worker,
hdt (i), is
−

Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i) +
∂Wt(i)
∂hdt (i)
1
Pt
nt(i)

+
∂yt(i)
∂hdt (i)
ψt(i) = 0,
where the partial derivative ∂Wt(i)
∂hdt (i)
= ∂Wt(i)∂Pt(i)
∂Pt(i)
∂yt(i)
∂yt(i)
∂hdt (i)
= 1θw
Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i) can be inserted in the last
expression to identify ψt(i) as the real marginal cost
ψt(i) =

1 + 1θw

Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i)
∂yt(i)
∂hdt (i)
=

1 + 1θw

Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i)hdt (i)
(1− α) yt(i)
. (9)
Moving (9) one period ahead and using the result in (8) leads to
1
θw
Etβt,t+1

hdt+1(i)
Wt+1(i)
Pt+1

= ϕt(i)−Etβt,t+1

(1− s)ϕt+1(i)

. (10)
The interpretation of (10) can be done in microeconomic terms: the marginal beneﬁt expected for a
new job on the left-hand side (measured as the expected net saving of work hours to accommodate
the new employee) must be equal to the marginal cost of creating a new job on the right-hand side.
The shadow value of a job for the ﬁrm, ϕt(i), can be extracted from the ﬁrst order condition on the
number of vacancies posted in period t, vt(i), which says
−c0(1 + c1) (vt(i))c1 + ϕt(i)qt = 0,
deﬁning ϕt(i), as the marginal cost of vacancy posting divided by the probability of making a match
ϕt(i) =
c0(1 + c1) (vt(i))
c1
qt
. (11)
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Prices are sticky. Following Calvo (1983), there is a constant probability 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 that the ﬁrm is
not able to set the optimal price. Supposing that the i ﬁrm receives the Calvo-type signal to price
optimally, the ﬁrst order condition that must satisfy is
Eηt
∞	
k=0
βt,t+kη
k

(1− θp)

P ∗t (i)
Pt+k

−θp yt+k
Pt+k
− ∂Wt+k(i)∂P∗t (i)
hdt+k(i)nt+k(i)
Pt+k
+ θpψt+k(i)

P∗t (i)
Pt+k

−θp−1 yt+k
Pt+k

= 0,
where Eηt is the rational expectation operator conditional to the lack of optimal pricing in future
periods, and P ∗t (i) is the optimal price set in period t. The partial derivative implied by (6)
∂Wt+k(i)
∂P ∗t (i)
=
− θpθw(1−α)
Wt+k(i)
P ∗t (i)
, the deﬁnition of the real marginal cost (9), and the demand constraint (1) can be
used in the previous expression to reach
Eηt
∞	
k=0
βt,t+kη
k

(1− θp)

P ∗t (i)
Pt+k

−θp yt+k
Pt+k
+ θp

1 +
1
θw

P∗t (i)
Pt+k

−θp−1 yt+k
Pt+k
ψt+k(i)

= 0, (12)
Equations (8) and (12) jointly determine the dynamic behavior of prices and employment. Log-
linearizing techniques can be used to ﬁnd linear approximations that explain the period-to-period
evolution of these variables. Borrowing the standard notation, the hat symbol on top of a variable
refers to the log deviation of that variable from its steady-state level. For example, nt = log ntn 
represents the log deviation of current aggregate employment, nt, from its steady state level, n. In
addition, tilde-topped variables denote relative variables measured as log deviations with respect to
the aggregate variable: the relative employment of ﬁrm i in period t is written as nt(i) = lognt(i)nt .
As shown in Appendix B, next period’s relative employment, nt+1(i), is inversely related to ﬁrm’s
expected relative price, Pt(i). In addition, search costs justify some inertial pattern for employment
accumulation that makes next period’s hiring depend upon the current level of employment. Thus,
relative employment dynamics are determined by the following log-linear expression
nt+1(i) = τ1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i), (13)
where the analytical solutions for τ1 and τ2 are
τ1 =
(1+ρ)c1(1−s)
(ρ+s)s
1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
, (14a)
τ2 =
η

(1+θ−1w )θp
1−α +τ2
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
. (14b)
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Meanwhile, the dynamic equation for aggregate employment ﬂuctuations becomes9

(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 = (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt + (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2
+Etht+1 +Et wt+1 + (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt,t+1 + (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt − (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1. (15)
As a consequence of convex search costs, the ﬂuctuation of next-period aggregation employment,
nt+1, depends on both its lag, nt, and its expected lead, Etnt+2. It gives both backward-looking
and forward-looking dynamics that smooth employment ﬂuctuations. The stochastic discount factor,
Etβt,t+1, expected hours per worker, Etht+1, and the expected real wage, Et wt+1, have also a positive
inﬂuence on next-period employment; these three variables increase the expected marginal return
of hirings at the ﬁrm level (see equation 10). In addition, the probability of a successful hiring,
qt, has a positive eﬀect on next-period employment. By contrast, next-period expected matching
probability, Etqt+1, has a negative impact on nt+1 because ﬁrms ﬁnd less costly to postpone hirings
for the future.
Also applying loglinearizing techniques, the pricing equation (12) leads to the inﬂation equation
(proof in Appendix B)
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1−βη)(1−η)
η

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 ψt, (16)
which shows that inﬂation dynamics are driven by ﬂuctuations of the real marginal cost, ψt, with
the standard forward-looking pattern of canonical New Keynesian models (Woodford, 2003, chapter
3).
The rest of the model is completed with a household instantaneous utility function, separable
between consumption and total hours
U(ct, h
s
tnt) =
c1−σt
1− σ −Ψ
(hstnt)
1+γ
1 + γ
,
and a standard household budget constraint as described in the optimizing program of Casares (2007).
The labor supply equation is obtained when substituting the ﬁrst order condition of consumption
into the ﬁrst order condition of the supply of total hours
hstnt =

wtc
−σ
t
Ψ
 1
γ
,
9Proof also available in Appendix B.
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where 1γ is the Frisch labor supply elasticity. In log-linear terms, the equilibrium real wage consistent
with the labor supply schedule is
wt = γht + γnt + σct. (17)
Combining ﬁrst order conditions of consumption and bonds leads to the standard semi-loglinear IS
curve
ct = Etct+1 − 1σ (Rt −Etπt+1). (18)
In addition, a Taylor-type monetary policy rule provides interest-rate reactions of the monetary
authority to the current rate of inﬂation, µπ > 1.0, to the log change in output (proxy of the output
gap), µy > 0, featuring a component of interest-rate smoothing, 0 < µR < 1 as follows
Rt = (1− µR)

µππt + µy (yt − yt−1)+ µRRt−1. (19)
Other dynamic equations have been introduced above: log ﬂuctuations of the aggregate real marginal
cost from the aggregation of (9) across ﬁrms
ψt = wt + nt − yt + ht, (20)
log ﬂuctuations of output around the steady-state level implied by the aggregation across ﬁrms of
the production function (2)
yt = (1− α)nt + ht + zt , (21)
log ﬂuctuations of unemployment from the loglinearization of ut = 1− nt
ut = −nunt, (22)
where nu is the employment-to-unemployment ratio in steady state; log ﬂuctuations of aggregate
vacancies obtained from the aggregation across ﬁrms of the loglinear version of (7)
vt = 1snt+1 − 1−ss nt − qt, (23)
log ﬂuctuations of matchings obtained by taking logs and aggregating across ﬁrms on the matching
function, mt =
utvt
uξt+v
ξ
t
1/ξ ,
mt = vξuξ+vξ ut + uξuξ+vξ vt, (24)
with the steady-state weights v
ξ
uξ+vξ
and u
ξ
uξ+vξ
; the loglinear probability of posting a successful
vacancy obtained from taking logs and aggregating across ﬁrms in the deﬁnition qt = mt/vt
qt = mt − vt, (25)
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the log-linearized overall resources constraint that includes the cost of vacancy postings
yt = cyct + c0(v)1+c1y (1 + c1)vt, (26)
where cy and
c0(v)1+c1
y are respectively the steady-state shares of consumption and search costs relative
to output; and the deﬁnition of log deviations of the intertemporal discount factor
Etβt,t+1 = −(Rt −Etπt+1). (27)
In summary, the macroeconomic model consists of thirteen equations, the set (15)-(27), that may
provide solution paths for its thirteen endogenous variables: yt, ct, Rt, πt, ψt, wt, nt+1, ht, ut, vt,mt, qt, and βt,t+1.
2.1 Baseline calibration
Table 1 provides a baseline quarterly calibration for the parameters of the model. Regarding search
frictions technology, I follow the empirical evidence reported by Yashiv (2007) to set a 5% separation
rate per quarter, s = 0.05. The elasticity of the marginal cost of posting a new vacancy is c1 = 0.05
to have it close to the usual linear technology (Walsh 2005, Christoﬀel and Kuester, 2008). As for
the scale parameter, I set the value c0 = 0.36 because it implies that search costs take 3% of total
output in steady state. The matching technology coeﬃcient is ξ = 8.15 in order to reproduce the
62% relative volatility of US aggregate employment with respect to aggregate output ﬂuctuations as
reported in Thomas (2011).10
10 It turns out that the relative volatility of aggregate employment is quite sensitive to the speciﬁcation of ξ.
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Table 1. Baseline calibration of model parameters.
Separation rate s = 0.05
Matching technology ξ = 8.15
Search cost elasticity c1 = 0.05
Search cost scale c0 = 0.36
Consumption utility curvature σ = 1.39
Labor utility curvature γ = 2.0
Steady-state discount factor β = 0.995
Production technology α = 0.36
Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity θp = 11.0
Dixit-Stiglitz labor supply elasticity θw = 20.0
Sticky-price probability η = 2/3
Monetary policy rule µπ = 1.5, µy = 0.5/4 and µR = 0.8
Technology shocks zt = 0.95zt−1 + εt
Std. deviation of innovations std(εt) = 1.52%
Household preferences are parameterized with a risk aversion coeﬃcient at σ = 1.39 as estimated
by Smets and Wouters (2007) in a DSGE model of the US economy. Meanwhile, the curvature
parameter on the disutility of labor is set at γ = 2.0 to result in a low Frisch labor supply elasticity
(γ−1 = 1/2 = 0.5) as suggested by numerous empirical studies (Altonji, 1986; Card, 1994; Blundell
and Macurdy, 1999). The steady-state quarterly discount factor β = 0.995, which implies a 2%
annualized real interest rate in steady state.
The production function (2) takes the usual capital-share coeﬃcient, α = 0.36, while the labor-
augmenting technology shock, zt, is randomly generated by an AR(1) stochastic process with a 95%
serial correlation. The standard deviation of the technological innovations is 1.52% to replicate the
variability observed in recent ﬂuctuations of US aggregate private employment.11
Price stickiness is deﬁned by the Calvo probability of non-optimal pricing η = 2/3, so as to have
an average frequency of setting optimal prices equal to three quarters, as recently observed in data
reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2009).12 The Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity is θp = 11.0 to
11As documented in Appendix A, the standard deviation of the quarterly series of HP-ﬁltered US Total Private
Employment is 1.37% over the sample period 1994:1-2010:4.
12Bils and Klenow (2004) founnd signiﬁcantly shorter price durations of around 5 months.
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imply a 10% mark-up in steady state as suggested by the empirical evidence found by Basu and
Fernald (1997). The Dixit-Stiglitz labor supply elasticity is θw = 20.0 to render a 5% participation
of search costs in the steady-state real marginal cost as in Krause et al. (2008).13 Finally, the
Taylor-type monetary policy rule is implemented with the original coeﬃcients suggested by Taylor
(1993), µπ = 1.5 and µy = 0.5/4, together with a rather high interest-rate smoothing coeﬃcient,
µR = 0.8.
2.2 Technology shocks and aggregate ﬂuctuations
Solid lines of Figure 1 show the responses of the calibrated model to a one standard deviation
positive technology innovation (1.52%). Dashed lines indicate the responses under fully-ﬂexible
pricing (η = 0.0). A positive productivity shock brings higher output, lower unemployment and a
decline in both inﬂation and the nominal interest rate. The responses of output and inﬂation are
larger and more immediate under ﬂexible prices. The adjustment of labor to the productivity shock
brings mixed eﬀects: the extensive margin (employment) increases substantially whereas the use of
the intensive margin (hours per worker) falls by a much lower extent. Firms take advantage of the
higher marginal beneﬁt of hiring to increase the number of workers. The number of job matchings
rises as a result of the increase in vacancy postings. Vacancies, matchings and employment respond
more rapidly and aggressively in the model variant with ﬂexible prices. Finally, the real wage is
much less procyclical with sticky prices because there is a slight decline at the quarter of the shock
that is quickly reversed to have a positive response in the next quarters.
3 Determinants of ﬁrm-level employment dispersion
The employment dispersion across ﬁrms is determined in equation (13) where next period’s relative
employment nt+1(i) depends upon current inﬂation and the relative price with constant elasticities
τ1 and −τ2. Solving out (14a) and (14b) for the proposed calibration in Table 1 gives rise to the
following numbers
τ1 = 0.7842, and τ2 = 1.1327,
13Following Krause et al. (2008), I can write the steady-state relation mc = s(1 + x), where mc is the real marginal
cost, s is the real unit labor cost and x is the search cost relative eﬀect. After calibration, x = 0.05.
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Figure 1: Impulse-response functions from a one standard deviation technology shock.
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which bring a moderate employment inertia (τ1 = 0.7842), and a substantial dependence of relative
prices on next period’s employment (τ2 = 1.1327).
The model can be used to look for the structural determinants of employment dispersion. The
unconditional standard deviation of relative employment ﬂuctuations, std(n(i)), provides a direct
measure of ﬁrm-level employment dispersion. Recalling (13) and Calvo-type staggered pricing, the
expression that obtains std(n(i)) is14
std(n(i)) =τ22+2τ1τ2 ητ21−ητ1
1−τ2
1
std
 P (i) . (28)
Using the results shown in Woodford’s (2003, pages 694-696), the standard deviation of relative
prices can be approximated by the following expression
std
 P (i) = η
(1−η)2
std (π) , (29)
where std (π) is the standard deviation of economy-wide inﬂation. Plugging (29) in (28) yields
std(n(i)) =

τ2
2
+2τ1τ2
ητ2
1−ητ1

η
(1−τ21)(1−η)
2 std (π) . (30)
Under the proposed calibration, I get std(n(i)) = 1.24%. What are the factors behind the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc employment variability? To answer this question, exercises of sensitive analysis can show
the eﬀects of altering the parameters of the baseline calibration to see the impact on employment
dispersion across ﬁrms, measured by std(n(i)). In particular, the following four parameters are
examined: the Calvo probability η which represents the degree of price stickiness, the Dixit-Stiglitz
labor supply elasticity θw, the convexity of search costs c1, and the Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity,
θp. Figure 2 displays the results.
In the top-left plot, it can be observed how ﬁrm-level employment dispersion is signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by the degree of price rigidity. As Calvo probability rises, the standard deviation of ﬁrm
relative employment increases signiﬁcantly, moving from less than 0.5% when η = 0.5 to levels close
to 10% reached when η is at 0.9. More slowly price adjustments (higher Calvo probability η) result
in wider price dispersion across ﬁrms (see 29); those ﬁrms that have not been able to set the optimal
price for many periods must face a larger discrepancy with respect to optimal pricing. In turn,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment variability rises with higher price stickiness. If price stickiness turns very
14See Appendix C for the proof.
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Figure 2: Determinants of ﬁrm-level employment dispersion, std(n(i)). Results under baseline cali-
bration are marked with ’*’.
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severe (as η approaches 1.0) ﬁrm-level employment dispersion falls dramatically because std (π) is
close to 0 in (30) as very few prices change.
The elasticity of substitution for labor supply allocation, θw, aﬀects employment dispersion in
the opposite direction: if labor supply elasticity is higher any excess demand for ﬁrm-speciﬁc hours
will be absorbed with a more moderate wage rise which buﬀers the reaction of employment. A rise
in labor supply elasticity implies a reduction of τ2 (with a lower value for θw in 14b) that has a
negative impact on std(n(i)) in (30). Such reduction of ﬁrm-level employment dispersion is only
noticeable for low elasticities. Figure 2 indicates that std(n(i)) rapidly declines from 1.75% to 1.25%
if the elasticity θw is raised from 1.0 to 3.0.
The convexity of search costs is quite inﬂuential on employment variability across ﬁrms. Figure
2 shows, in the bottom-left plot, a reduction in the value of std (n(i)) from more than 3% to values
close to 0% when the curvature of the search cost function is raised from 0.01 to 0.5. Thus, a more
costly search process (higher c1) results in less ﬁrm-level employment dispersion: if vacancy posting
is more expensive the ﬁrm will slow down job creation.
Finally, the bottom-right plot of Figure 2 indicates that if demand elasticity rises the variability
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment ﬂuctuations increases in a moderate way. This eﬀect is found in the
model because a higher Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity would increase the dispersion of ﬁrms on
demand-determined output (1), total hours (4) and the nominal wage (6). In turn, the sensitivity
of relative employment to changes in the relative price is higher. Formally, τ2 depends positively on
θp as indicated in (14b) and a higher τ2 raises the measure of employment dispersion, std(n(i)), in
(30). In the interval [5,15] for values assigned to θp, the observed std(n(i)) goes up from 0.6% to
1.6% as displayed in Figure 2.
4 Industry-level employment ﬂuctuations
Let us deﬁne one industry as a group of ﬁrms. For simplicity, all industries have the same size in
our model. There are I industries formed by S ﬁrms each, that cover the total number of ﬁrms N ,
which implies N = S ∗ I. Relative employment in the j industry, int(j) = log int(i)nt , is deﬁned as
the average across the ﬁrms that belong to that industry15
int(j) =  Sj
1+S(j−1)
nt(i)di, (31)
15 In the detrended steady-state, all ﬁrms share the same constant level of employment.
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for j = 1, 2, ..., I. Firms are ranked from number 1 to number N , the ﬁrst set of S ﬁrms belong to
industry number 1, ﬁrms from number 1+S to number 2S belong to industry 2, ﬁrms from number
1 + 2S to number 3S belongs to industry 3, and so forth.
By model assumption, industry-level employment is one-period predetermined alike ﬁrm-level
employment. Then, relative industry-level employment for period t+1 is determined in period t by
rewriting (31) one period ahead, where inserting the ﬁrm-level relationship (13) gives
int+1(j) =  Sj
1+S(j−1)

τ 1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i)di. (32)
Relative employment in the j-th industry for next period is explained by the average of current
relative employment and current relative prices, across the set of ﬁrms that belong to that j industry.
Hence, the outcome of Calvo lotteries determines relative prices and relative employment. If a ﬁrm
i that belongs to the j industry could set the optimal price, its relative price Pt(i) would be the
log diﬀerence between the optimal price and the aggregate price level, i.e. Pt(i) = P ∗t (i). As shown
in Appendix B, the relative optimal price P ∗t (i) is determined by a forward-looking equation that
includes both the expected real marginal costs and expected inﬂation
P ∗t (i) = 1−βη
1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
Et
∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k +Et ∞	
k=1
βkηkπt+k. (33a)
If the Calvo-type signal for the i ﬁrm that belongs to the j industry did not allow optimal pricing,
the ﬁrm would have its price stuck to the value from the previous period with the relative price16
Pt(i) = Pt−1(i)− πt. (33b)
Therefore, Calvo lotteries determine relative price dynamics through either (33a) or (33b). Such
relative pricing across ﬁrms that belong to the j-th industry can be used in (32). Finally, the
dynamic equation for the log ﬂuctuation of industry-level employment is obtained from inserting
(32) in the deﬁnition int+1(j) = int+1(j)− nt+1 and solving out for int+1(j) to reach
int+1(j) =  Sj
1+S(j−1)

τ1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i)di+ nt+1, (34)
where nt+1 is the log ﬂuctuation of aggregate employment governed by equation (15) of the model.
The business cycle properties of industry-level employment are examined in the model by comput-
ing second-moment statistics of volatility, correlation or autocorrelation from simulation exercises.
16Noticing that when the price of ﬁrm i cannot be adjusted Pt(i) ≡ logPt(i) − logPt = logPt−1(i) − logPt =
logPt−1(i)− logPt−1 + logPt−1 − logPt = Pt−1(i)− πt.
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Artiﬁcial series are generated from random draws of a normal distribution with a standard deviation
ﬁxed at the calibrated value of 1.52%. These draws provide white-noise innovations, εt, for the AR(1)
technology shocks, zt = 0.95zt−1 + εt. Total number of ﬁrms is set at N = 10, 000 and I assume
several (alternative) industrial sizes: S = 1, S = 10, S = 100, S = 1, 000 and S = 10, 000. This is a
wide range of industrial size from having single-ﬁrm industries (S = 1) to the case in which all ﬁrms
belong to the same industry (S = N = 10, 000) and industry-level employment coincides with aggre-
gate employment. As discussed above, ﬁrms (and industries) are diﬀerentiated due to their history
of Calvo lotteries. Therefore, 10,000 independent signals are also randomly generated from a [0, 1]
uniform distribution for every sample period. Recalling the baseline Calvo probability (η = 2/3), if
the number drawn is higher than 2/3, the ﬁrm could price optimally following (33a). Otherwise, the
relative price would directly be (33b). Industry-level employment is then computed in (34) with the
calibrated coeﬃcients τ1 = 0.7842 and τ2 = 1.1327. The artiﬁcial samples contain 200 observations,
and the ﬁrst 20 observations are discarded to guarantee a random start. Second-moment statistics of
volatility (standard deviation), cyclical correlation (coeﬃcient of correlation with aggregate output)
and serial correlation (coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of order 1) are calculated for industry-level em-
ployment at the alternative levels of industrial size, S. This exercise was repeated 5,000 times and
the average values are reported next in Table 2:
Table 2. Employment ﬂuctuations. Second-moment statistics.
Baseline model Std. dev, % Corr. with output Autocorrelation
Firm-level employment 2.29 0.54 0.96
Industry-level employment (S = 10 ﬁrms) 1.49 0.81 0.98
Industry-level employment (S = 100 ﬁrms) 1.38 0.87 0.99
Industry-level employment (S = 1, 000 ﬁrms) 1.37 0.88 0.99
Aggregate employment 1.37 0.88 0.99
US data: Std. dev, % Corr. with output Autocorrelation
Industry-level employment 1.90 0.45 0.91
Aggregate employment 1.37 0.81 0.95
It can be observed that the size reduces the standard deviation of industry-level employment. As
more ﬁrms are included in each industry, the averaging (smoothing) eﬀect on ﬁrm-level employment
ﬂuctuations makes industry-level employment less volatile. By contrast, the co-movement between
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industry-level employment and aggregate employment is more intense with a higher industrial size,
S.17 However, even in the limit case of only one ﬁrm per industry (S = 1), the correlation coeﬃcient
between ﬂuctuations of industry-level employment and output is still moderate at 0.54. Finally,
industry-level employment is very persistent at all levels of industrial size. As reported in Table 2,
the coeﬃcient of autocorrelation increases slightly with larger industrial size, and it is close to the
1.0 upper bound in all the cases.
US data of industry-level and aggregate employment ﬂuctuations are collected in Appendix A.
The bottom rows of Table 2 provide their second-moment statistics. Comparing with the simulation
results of the model, the volatility of US industry-level employment (standard deviation at 1.90%) is
greater than in the model except in the case of single-ﬁrm industries (standard deviation at 2.29%).
Meanwhile, the cyclical correlation of industry-level employment is lower in US data (0.45) than
in the model with any industrial size S. Regarding the serial correlation, the strong persistence in
industry-level employment (with any S) of the model is slightly above the 0.91 value of coeﬃcient of
autocorrelation found in US data.
Figure 3 illustrates these results by displaying the statistics of volatility and cyclical correlation
obtained in one model simulation. The standard deviation of ﬁrm-level employment is between 1%
and 5% and it diminishes between 0.8% and 1.8% in 10-ﬁrm industry-level employment (S = 10).
A larger size of industries (S = 100 or S = 100) brings standard deviations much closer to that
of aggregate employment. As for the correlation with aggregate output, the simulations with small
industries give a wide range of coeﬃcients of correlation. Some numbers even turn negative when
S = 1, whereas industry-level employment shows a strong procyclical co-movement with a large S.
Summarizing, the baseline model is only able to produce industry-level employment volatility ob-
served in recent US data if the number of ﬁrms per industry is between 1 and 10. This low volatility
might be connected to the fact there is only one source for ﬁrm-level employment diﬀerentiation: the
history of Calvo-style lotteries received by the ﬁrms. Next, a second source of diﬀerentiation across
ﬁrms is incorporated to the model: ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks, with the objective of increas-
ing variability of industry-level employment ﬂuctuations to provide a better ﬁt with the observed
volatility in US data.
17This result can be explained by the relative eﬀect of those ﬁrms that do not receive the Calvo-type signal and make
countercyclical hiring decisions as they must keep prices unchanged.
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Figure 3: Percent standard deviations (o, left) and output correlations (*, right) of employment
ﬂuctuations in one baseline model simulation. Horizontal lines indicate average values.
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4.1 Introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks
The production function of the representative i-th ﬁrm (2) can be slightly modiﬁed to accommodate
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor-augmenting technology shock, zt(i),
yt(i) =

exp(zt(i))h
d
t (i)nt(i)
1−α
. (2’)
The inﬂuence of zt(i) on the production capabilities of the ﬁrm is transmitted to the demand for total
hours, the hours-clearing nominal wage, the quantity of output produced, and the pricing decision.
Hence, combining (2’) with the Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve (1), the demand for total hours at the
i-th ﬁrm would change to
hdt (i)nt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt

−
θp
1−α y
1
1−α
t
exp(zt(i))
, (4’)
while the hours-clearing nominal wage, Wt(i), would also incorporate zt(i) to be
Wt(i) =
Pt
c−σt
Pt(i)
Pt

−
θp
1−α y
1
1−α
t
exp(zt(i))
 1θw . (6’)
Both the demand for total hours (4’) and the nominal wage (6’) will have inﬂuence in the hiring
decision of the ﬁrm. A positive relative technology shock raises relative labor productivity, lowers
the relative demand for hours (as indicated in 4’), and cuts the relative hours-clearing nominal
wage (as indicated in 6’). As shown in the Appendix D, the relative employment dynamics of the
representative i-th ﬁrm is governed by the following equation
nt+1(i) = τ1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i) + τ3zt(i), (13’)
where zt(i) = zt(i)− zt is the relative technology shock, τ1 and τ2 have identical analytical solutions
as in the baseline model, τ3 depends upon the structural parameters as follows:
τ3 =

τ3
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s +τ4(1−η)

(1+θ−1w )θp
1−α +τ2
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

−(1+θ−1w )

ρz
1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
, (35)
and ρz is the coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks (deﬁned below).
Unlike the baseline model, the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks makes the optimal
pricing decision be ﬁrm speciﬁc. Thus, the optimal price will be lower than the average optimal
price if the ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shock is above the average technology shock. Put diﬀerently,
a positive ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shock reduces the relative wage in (6’) and lowers the marginal
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cost of production which makes the optimal price move downwards. In formal terms, the negative
relationship between relative optimal prices and ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks is collected at the
following loglinear expression P ∗t (i) = P ∗t − τ4zt(i), (36)
where P ∗t (i) = logP ∗t (i)Pt  and P ∗t =  N
1
logP ∗t (i)di. Recalling that P ∗t = 1−βη
1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
Et

∞
k=0 β
kηkψt+k+
Et

∞
k=1 β
kηkπt+k, (36) becomes
P ∗t (i) = 1−βη
1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
Et
∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k +Et ∞	
k=1
βkηkπt+k − τ4zt(i), (37)
which is comparable to equation (33a) in the baseline model. As also shown in the Appendix D, the
analytical solution for τ4 is
τ4 =
(1+θ−1w )(1−βη)
(1−βηρz)

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 . (38)
Inserting in (35) and (38) the numerical values of the parameters deﬁned at the baseline calibration
(Table 1) and also ρz = 0.95, it is obtained, τ3 = 0.0728 and τ4 = 0.1188; which, as postulated
above, indicate a positive elasticity of ﬁrm-level employment to its speciﬁc technology shock and a
negative elasticity of optimal pricing in response to the speciﬁc technology shock.
The introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks is made through a generalization of the baseline model
described above. For the representative i-th ﬁrm, let us take the AR(1) generating process
zt(i) = ρzzt−1(i) + εt(i), (39)
where εt(i) is deﬁned as one linear combination between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovation χt (i) and the
economy-wide average innovation18
εt(i) = φχt (i) + (1− φ)
N
1
χt (i) di,
with 0 < φ < 1. Redeﬁning the aggregate technology innovation as the average across ﬁrm-speciﬁc
innovations, εt =
 N
1
χt (i)di, the relative technology shock, zt(i) = zt(i)−zt, that results from (39)
is
zt(i) = ρzzt−1(i) + φ (χt (i)− εt) . (40)
18Pesaran and Xu (2013) assume a similar combination between idiosyncratic and economy-wide exogenous pertur-
bations for technology shocks.
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Setting φ = 0 reduces the model to the case of one economy where all ﬁrms receive the same tech-
nology innovation, εt, which recovers the setup described in Section 2 with economy-wide technology
shocks. Obviously, there is a connection between ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks and aggregate shocks. Since
all ﬁrm-level innovations are i.i.d. draws, the standard deviation of the economy-wide technology
innovation is related to that of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovation as follows
std(εt) =
1√
N
std(εt(i)),
which, as pointed out by Gabaix (2011), induces a very rapid reduction in aggregate volatility when
the number of ﬁrms increases. For example, if N = 10, 000 ﬁrms and the calibrated volatility of the
aggregate innovations is std(εt) = 1.52% the required standard deviation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovations
is std(εt(i)) =
√
Nstd(εt) = 152%.
The value assigned to φ is aimed at ﬁxing the problem of low volatility of industry-level employ-
ment in the model. Comin and Philippon (2005) observe that the volatility of ﬁrm-level sales growth
have been in the US between 5 and 15 times higher than aggregate real GDP volatility.19 They
also report international evidence on the relative volatility of ﬁrm-level employment: many coun-
tries concentrate around a 10-time factor between ﬁrm-level and aggregate employment volatilities.
After some preliminary testing, I set φ = 0.03 to obtain average standard deviations of ﬁrm-level
employment and output that are not far from 10 times higher than the standard deviations of their
respective aggregate ﬂuctuations.20
Table 3 informs that volatility of both ﬁrm-level and industry-level employment rises dramatically
with the introduction of calibrated ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology innovations (φ = 0.03). The average
standard deviation of ﬁrm-level employment is 10.9%, around 5 times the number found in the
model without ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks (go to Table 2 for the comparison). If industries are represented
by groups of 10 ﬁrms the standard deviation of employment ﬂuctuations is also higher at 3.69%. If
the industrial size is S = 100 ﬁrms, the model nearly replicates the standard deviation of average
US industry-level employment ﬂuctuations (1.76% in the model and 1.90% in US data). The case
with large industries (S = 1, 000) still keeps a substantial ﬁrm-level employment variability at 1.47%.
Regarding the correlation with output, ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks lower the coeﬃcients of cyclical correlation
obtained in the baseline model. A moderate industrial size (some number between S = 10 and
19Comin and Mulani (2006) provide empirical evidence for a trend increase in sales growth volatility in US ﬁrms.
20Concretely, std(y(i))/std(y) = 11.59 and std(n(i))/std(n) = 7.85.
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S = 100) would give the correlation between industry-level employment and output found in US
data (0.45). As reported in Table 3, the cyclical correlation of industry-level employment in the
model is 0.32 with S = 10 and 0.68 with S = 100.21 Finally, the autocorrelation of employment
ﬂuctuations is very high (0.99) with any industrial sizes.
Table 3. Employment ﬂuctuations. Second-moment statistics with ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks (φ = 0.03).
Model with sticky prices (η = 2/3) Std. dev, % Corr. with output Autocorrelation
Firm-level employment 10.9 0.11 0.99
Industry-level employment (S = 10 ﬁrms) 3.69 0.32 0.99
Industry-level employment (S = 100 ﬁrms) 1.76 0.68 0.99
Industry-level employment (S = 1, 000 ﬁrms) 1.47 0.83 0.99
Aggregate employment 1.39 0.88 0.99
Model with ﬂexible prices (η = 0)
Firm-level employment 11.4 0.13 0.99
Industry-level employment (S = 10 ﬁrms) 3.95 0.37 0.99
Industry-level employment (S = 100 ﬁrms) 2.06 0.73 0.98
Industry-level employment (S = 1, 000 ﬁrms) 1.80 0.84 0.98
Aggregate employment 1.73 0.88 0.98
US data: Std. dev, % Corr. with output Autocorrelation
Industry-level employment 1.90 0.45 0.91
Aggregate employment 1.37 0.81 0.95
Figure 4 shows the results obtained in one simulated example for a comparison to the baseline
model without ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks displayed in Figure 3. It is conﬁrmed that both ﬁrm-level and
industry-level ﬂuctuations of employment are much more volatile and co-move much less in the model
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
After the model extension, the two sources of ﬁrm-level employment heterogeneity are price rigidi-
ties (history of Calvo-type signals) and the realization of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. How would the results
21Alternatively, the current setup might be transformed to accommodate higher comovement between industry-level
and aggregate employment ﬂuctuations with small-size industries. For example, Long and Plosser (1983) give cross-
sectoral cost shares by industries. Or as in a recent paper by Gabaix (2011), a fat-tailed distribution of ﬁrms may
reduce signiﬁcantly the diversiﬁcation eﬀects and gain co-movement through the inﬂuence of idiosyncratic shocks of
large ﬁrms on aggregate ﬂuctuations.
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Figure 4: Percent standard deviations (o, left) and output correlations (*, right) of employment
ﬂuctuations in model simulation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks and φ = 0.03. Horizontal lines
indicate average values.
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change if prices would be freely adjusted by all ﬁrms (and the sticky-price channel would remain shut
down)? I did the experiment of recalculating second-moment statistics of ﬁrm-level, industry-level
and aggregate employment ﬂuctuations in the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks (φ = 0.03) and without
sticky prices ( η = 0). The central rows of Table 3 show the results. Remarkably, numbers do not
diﬀer substantially from the sticky-price case: both volatility and cyclical correlation are just slightly
higher with ﬂexible prices. Therefore, price rigidities play a minor role for disaggregated unemploy-
ment ﬂuctuations with technology shocks. By contrast, ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity innovations are
crucial to shape volatilities or cyclical correlation of both industry-level and ﬁrm-level ﬂuctuations
of employment.
5 Conclusions
In recent US business cycles, both volatility and cyclical correlation of employment ﬂuctuations
decline when aggregating from industry-level to aggregate data. The average standard deviation
across industry-level employment has been 1.90%, whereas the standard deviation of aggregate em-
ployment is 1.37%. In addition, the correlation between aggregate employment and real GDP is
0.81, while that correlation for industry-level employment falls to 0.45. This paper has presented
a calibrated model with heterogeneous labor across ﬁrms to examine employment ﬂuctuations at
diﬀerent levels of aggregation.
In the structural analysis, the determinants of ﬁrm-level employment dispersion are price stick-
iness, convexity of search costs for job creation, a low elasticity of substitution in the labor supply,
and a high elasticity of substitution in the demand for goods. These factors explain why ﬁrm-level
volatility of employment is signiﬁcantly higher than aggregate employment ﬂuctuations. Industry-
level employment is obtained as the average employment in a group of ﬁrms. After calibration of
parameters, industry-level employment ﬂuctuations are found to be less volatile and more procyclical
than in US employment data. Thus, the model is modiﬁed to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology
shocks in order to increase the average volatility of industry-level employment ﬂuctuations. Simula-
tions with a medium industrial size give a good model ﬁt of volatility, cyclical correlation and persis-
tence of US industry-level employment. Even in the model variant with ﬂexible prices, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technology shocks bring realistic second-moment patterns of industry-level employment ﬂuctuations,
which leaves price stickiness with a minor role for the empirical ﬁt.
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Appendix A. US industrial employment data.
Second moments statistics of HP-ﬁltered US industry-level employment, 1994:1-2010:4.
Standard Correlation Auto
Weight deviation, % with output correlation
Mining (21) .0060 3.70 0.41 0.90
Construction of buildings (236) .0160 3.65 0.79 0.95
Heavy and civil engineering construction (237) .0093 3.07 0.70 0.93
Specialty trade contractors (238) .0422 3.54 0.78 0.95
Wood products (321) .0056 4.05 0.87 0.93
Nonmetallic mineral products (327) .0052 2.90 0.83 0.93
Primary metals (331) .0055 3.77 0.77 0.91
Fabricated metal products (332) .0164 3.34 0.75 0.93
Machinery (333) .0134 3.55 0.59 0.93
Computer and electronic products (334) .0158 3.46 0.51 0.94
Electrical equipment and appliances (335) .0053 2.80 0.66 0.93
Motor vehicles and parts (3361,2,3) .0116 4.45 0.84 0.87
Furniture and related products (337) .0060 3.67 0.89 0.94
Food manufacturing (311) .0159 0.48 0.05 0.70
Apparel (315) .0045 2.41 0.56 0.85
Paper and paper products (322) .0056 1.38 0.71 0.90
Printing and related support activities (323) .0074 2.18 0.72 0.94
Chemicals (325) .0096 1.02 0.63 0.93
Plastic and rubber products (326) .0087 2.50 0.83 0.88
Wholesale trade of durable goods (423) .0315 2.17 0.77 0.96
Wholesale trade of nondurable goods (424) .0210 0.94 0.76 0.91
Electronic markets and agents and brokers (425) .0071 1.77 0.67 0.95
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).22
22The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides a wide range of monthly employment data, with several levels
of disaggregation. I obtained quarterly series by making three-month average values in industries classiﬁed by the
BLS, excluding small industries with less than 400,000 workers in 1994. The sample covers 67 industries that account
for approximately 89% of the series of Total Private Employment (TPE) also reported by the BLS. The short-run
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Second moments statistics of HP-ﬁltered US industrial employment, 1994:1-2010:4 (cont’d.).
Standard Correlation Auto
Weight deviation, % with output correlation
Motor vehicle and parts dealers (441) .0187 1.80 0.74 0.89
Furniture and home furnishings stores (442) .0054 2.90 0.85 0.92
Electronics and appliance stores (443) .0053 2.62 0.71 0.92
Building material and garden supply stores (444) .0120 1.78 0.69 0.91
Food and beverage stores (445) .0301 0.74 0.41 0.93
Health and personal care stores (446) .0096 0.99 0.35 0.91
Gasoline stations (447) .0094 0.80 0.36 0.90
Clothing and clothing accessories stores (448) .0140 2.13 0.79 0.91
Sporting goods, hobby, book, and music stores (451) .0067 1.77 0.53 0.82
Department stores (4521) .0169 1.57 0.43 0.85
Air transportation (481) .0055 2.82 0.45 0.88
Truck transportation (484) .0140 2.35 0.79 0.93
Support activities for transportation (488) .0054 2.18 0.69 0.92
Couriers and messengers (492) .0058 2.67 0.37 0.62
Warehousing and storage (493) .0057 2.02 0.73 0.94
Utilities (22) .0062 0.97 -0.30 0.94
Publishing industries except Internet (511) .0096 2.06 0.64 0.95
Motion picture and sound recording industries (512) .0038 1.92 0.38 0.70
Telecommunications (517) .0117 3.57 0.30 0.96
Credit intermediation and related activities (522) .0274 1.71 0.45 0.93
Securities, commodity contracts, investments (523) .0078 3.17 0.57 0.96
Insurance carriers and related activities (524) .0232 0.97 0.37 0.93
Real estate (531) .0141 1.18 0.66 0.92
components of these series were obtained by taking the natural logarithms and running the HP ﬁlter. For the cyclical
correlation with output, I also used the HP-ﬁltered component of the series of US Real GDP available at St. Louis
Fed website. In the Table, the number in parenthesis after each industry indicates its North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) code. The column labeled "Weight" provides the coeﬃcient used for the computation
of the weighted averages, deﬁned as the ratio of the sample mean of industrial employment over TPE.
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Second moments statistics of HP-ﬁltered US industrial employment, 1994:1-2010:4 (cont’d.).
Standard Correlation Auto
Weight deviation, % with output correlation
Rental and leasing services (532) .0064 1.83 0.76 0.93
Legal services (5411) .0113 0.83 0.51 0.91
Accounting and bookkeeping services (5412) .0087 2.68 0.46 0.91
Architectural and engineering services (5413) .0127 2.67 0.58 0.96
Computer systems design and related services (5415) .0116 4.45 0.53 0.96
Management and technical consulting services (5416) .0076 2.51 0.36 0.93
Management of companies and enterprises (55) .0185 1.62 0.59 0.96
Employment services (5613) .0330 6.16 0.91 0.91
Business support services (5614) .0079 1.91 0.29 0.92
Services to buildings and dwellings (5617) .0167 1.53 0.74 0.91
Educational services (61) .0268 0.80 -0.36 0.74
Oﬃces of physicians (6211) .0202 0.34 0.08 0.86
Home health care services (6216) .0080 3.33 -0.33 0.95
Hospitals (622) .0436 0.51 -0.36 0.92
Nursing and residential care facilities (623) .0282 0.51 -0.73 0.92
Social assistance (624) .0210 0.94 0.27 0.84
Arts, entertainment, and recreation (71) .0184 1.37 0.56 0.80
Accommodation (721) .0186 1.82 0.74 0.89
Food services and drinking places (722) .0888 0.86 0.60 0.92
Repair and maintenance (811) .0125 1.30 0.59 0.91
Personal and laundry services (812) .0129 0.62 0.40 0.83
Membership associations and organizations (813) .0285 0.89 -0.18 0.88
Weighted average for industrial employment: 1.90 0.45 0.91
Total Private Employment (TPE) 1.37 0.81 0.95
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Appendix B. Derivation of the employment and inﬂation equations in the baseline model.
The employment equation
Optimality in ﬁrm-level hiring decisions is determined by equations (10) and (11), subject to the
employment accumulation constraint (7). The substitution of both (11) and the equation correspon-
dent to (11) for period t+ 1 in equation (10) yields
1
θw
Etβt,t+1

hdt+1(i)
Wt+1(i)
Pt+1

= c0(1+c1)(vt(i))
c1
qt
−Etβt,t+1

(1−s)c0(1+c1)(vt+1(i))
c1
qt+1

, (B1)
which can be loglinearized to reach
Ethdt+1(i)+Et Wt+1(i)−Wt+1+Et wt+1 = 1+ρρ+s c1vt(i)− qt −Etβt+1−1−sρ+s [c1Etvt+1(i)−Etqt+1] ,
(B2)
where wt+1 = Wt+1 − Pt+1. Meanwhile, taking logs in (6) and subtracting the log of the aggregate
nominal wage yields Wt(i) = − θpθw(1−α) Pt(i), (B3)
where Wt(i) = logWt(i)Wt  and Pt(i) = logPt(i)Pt  respectively are relative wages and prices. Simi-
larly, taking logs in (4) and subtracting the log of aggregate total hours leads to the following (log
of) demand for hours depending on relative employment and relative prices
hdt (i) = −nt(i)− θp1−α Pt(i) + ht. (B4)
Moving (B4) and (B3) one period forward leads to expressions for Ethdt+1(i) and EtWt+1(i) such as
Ethdt+1(i) = −nt+1(i)− θp1− αEt Pt+1(i) +Etht+1, and
Et
Wt+1(i)−Wt+1 = − θpθw(1−α)Et Pt+1(i),
which can be inserted in the loglinear optimality condition (B2) to obtain
−Etnt+1(i)− (1+θ−1w )θp1−α Et Pt+1(i) +Etht+1 +Et wt+1 =
1+ρ
ρ+s

c1vt(i)− qt −Etβt+1− 1−sρ+s [c1Etvt+1(i)−Etqt+1] . (B5)
Log deviations of ﬁrm-speciﬁc current vacancies, vt(i), can be obtained by loglinearizing (7) rear-
ranging terms, as follows
vt(i) = 1
s
nt+1(i)− 1− s
s
nt(i)− qt = 1
s
(nt+1(i) + nt+1)− 1− s
s
(nt(i) + nt)− qt, (B6)
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Both (B6) and its corresponding expression one period ahead for Etvt+1(i) are substituted in (B5)
to obtain
−Etnt+1(i)− (1+θ−1w )θp1−α Et Pt+1(i) +Etht+1 +Et wt+1 =
1+ρ
ρ+s

c1

1
s
(nt+1(i) + nt+1)− 1− s
s
(nt(i) + nt)− qt− qt −Etβt+1
− 1−sρ+s

c1Et

1
s
(nt+2(i) + nt+2)− 1− s
s
(nt+1(i) + nt+1)− qt+1−Etqt+1 ,
which is equivalent to
−

1 + (1+ρ)c1(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s

Etnt+1(i) + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt(i) + (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2(i) =
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 − (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt − (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2 + (1+θ−1w )θp1−α Et Pt+1(i)−Etht+1 −Et wt+1
− (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1 − (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt + (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1. (B7)
The result obtained in (B7) implies a certain relationship between ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment and
pricing of the following kind
nt+1(i) = τ1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i), (B8)
where τ1 and τ2 are undetermined coeﬃcients to be found below. Using (B8) to infer Etnt+2(i), it
is obtained
Etnt+2(i) = τ1nt+1(i)− τ2Et Pt+1(i),
which after being plugged in (B7) results in
−

1 + (1+ρ)c1(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s − τ 1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

Etnt+1(i) + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt(i) =
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1− (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt− (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2+ (1+θ−1w )θp1−α + τ2 (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Et Pt+1(i)−Etht+1−Et wt+1
− (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1 − (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt + (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1. (B9)
Moreover, the Calvo-style pricing scheme implies that the expected relative price Et Pt+1(i) is calcu-
lated as a weighted average between the current price and the expected optimal price
Et Pt+1(i) = η (logPt(i)−Et logPt+1) + (1− η)Et P ∗t+1(i). (B10)
Calvo pricing also implies P ∗t (i) = η1−ηπt and, subsequently, Et P ∗t+1(i) = η1−ηEtπt+1 that can be used
in (B10) to yield
Et Pt+1(i) = η Pt(i),
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which it is inserted in (B9) to obtain
−

1 + (1+ρ)c1(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s − τ 1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

Etnt+1(i) + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt(i) =
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1− (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt− (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2+η  (1+θ−1w )θp1−α + τ2 (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s  Pt(i)−Etht+1−Et wt+1
− (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1 − (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt + (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1. (B11)
The aggregation of (B11) over the continuum of ﬁrms leads to the macro relationship that determines
employment ﬂuctuations

(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 = Etht+1 +Et wt+1 + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt
+ (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2 + (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1 + (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt − (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1 (15)
which is equation (15) in the main text. Another consequence of (B11) is that the analytical expres-
sions for the undetermined coeﬃcients τ1 and τ2, consistent with the assumed relationship (B8),
are
τ1 =
(1+ρ)c1(1−s)
(ρ+s)s
1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
, and
τ2 =
η

(1+θ−1w )θp
1−α +τ2
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
,
that respectively become expressions (14a) and (14b) in the main text.
The inﬂation equation
I start by making a log-linear approximation to the price setting equation (12) that renders
P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηk
 Pt+k + ψt+k(i) , (B12)
where log deviations from steady state of ﬁrm-speciﬁc real marginal costs can be obtained from (9)
as follows ψt+k(i) = Wt+k(i)− Pt+k + nt+k(i)− yt+k(i) + hdt+k(i). (B13)
Subtracting log deviations of the aggregate real marginal cost, ψt+k =  N
1
ψt+k(i)di, from (B13)
yields ψt+k(i) = ψt+k +Wt+k(i) + nt+k(i)− yt+k(i) + hdt+k(i),
where using (B3) for Wt+k(i), the log-linear version of (1) for yt+k(i), and (B4) for hdt+k(i), I get
ψt+k(i) = ψt+k − θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Pt+k(i). (B14)
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Inserting (B14) in (B12), it is obtained
P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
j=0
βjηj
 Pt+j + ψt+j − θp(γ+α)1−α Pt+j(i) ,
where subtracting the log of the aggregate price level, Pt, on both sides of the equation, I reach
P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηk
ψt+k − θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Pt+k(i) + k	
x=1
πt+x

. (B15)
The rational expectation of future relative prices, conditional to optimal pricing in t and the lack of
optimal price adjustments in the future, is Eηt
Pt+k(i) = P ∗t (i)−Et Pt+k = P ∗t (i)− Pt+ Pt−Et Pt+k =P ∗t (i) +Etkx=1 πt+x. Using this result, (B15) becomes
1 +
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηk
ψt+k + 1 + θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Et k	
x=1
πt+x

,
which is equivalent to
1 +
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k + 1 + θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Et ∞	
k=1
βkηkπt+k,
or alternatively P ∗t (i) = 1− βη
1 +
θp(θ−1w +α)
1−α
Et
∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k +Et ∞	
k=1
βkηkπt+k. (B16)
Combining (B16) with P ∗t (i) = η1−ηπt from the Calvo pricing scheme leads to
πt =
(1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
Et
∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k + 1−ηη Et ∞	
k=1
βkηkπt+k,
where one can do πt−βηEtπt+1 to reach the New Keynesian Phillips curve (16) that governs inﬂation
dynamics
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1−βη)(1−η)
η

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 ψt.
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Appendix C. Derivation of the standard deviation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc relative employment.
From the dynamic evolution of relative employment, nt+1(i) = τ1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i), the variance of
relative employment is
var(n(i)) = (1− τ21)−1 τ22var( P (i))− 2τ1τ2cov(n(i), P (i)) .
The covariance between relative employment and the relative price is the expected product of relative
employment times the relative price
cov(n(i), P (i)) = E n(i) · P (i)
where the relative price is obtained as a weighted average between lagged relative prices (adjusted
by current inﬂation) and the optimal relative price
P (i) = η( P−1(i)− π) + (1− η) P ∗(i).
Combining the last two expressions and recalling the Calvo-style pricing to use P ∗t (i) = η1−ηπt, I
have
cov(n(i), P (i)) = E n(i)η( P−1(i)− π) + (1− η) η1−ηπ = ηE n(i) · P−1(i) .
Lagging the dynamic equation on relative employment, nt(i) = τ1nt−1(i) − τ2 Pt−1(i), and using
again P ∗t = η1−ηπt, it is obtained
cov(n(i), P (i)) = ηE n(i) · P−1(i) = ηE τ1n−1(i)− τ2 P−1(i) · P−1(i) ,
where I can use E
 P−1(i)2 = var  P (i), and E n−1(i) · P−1(i) = cov(n(i), P (i)) to reach
cov(n(i), P (i)) = ητ1cov(n(i), P (i))− ητ2var  P (i) .
Solving the last expression for cov(n(i), P (i)), it is obtained
cov(n(i), P (i)) = − ητ21−ητ1 var  P (i) ,
and substituting the result in the expression for var(n(i)) that is displayed above gives
var(n(i)) = (1− τ21)−1 τ22var( P (i)) + 2τ1τ2 ητ21−ητ1 var  P (i) = τ 22 + 2τ1τ2 ητ21−ητ11− τ21 var
 P (i) ,
where taking the square root leads to the expression for the standard deviation of relative employment
std(n(i)) =τ22+2τ1τ2 ητ21−ητ1
1−τ2
1
std
 P (i) ,
that is used in Section 3 of the text.
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Appendix D. Derivation of the employment and inﬂation equations in the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technology shocks.
Firm-speciﬁc employment dynamics are governed by the loglinearized equation that determines
optimal hiring, which was displayed above as equation (A2)
Ethdt+1(i) +EtWt+1(i) +Et wt+1 = 1+ρρ+s c1vt(i)− qt −Etβt+1− 1−sρ+s [c1Etvt+1(i)−Etqt+1] . (D1)
Remarkably, the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks has an inﬂuence on ﬁrm-speciﬁc
employment through the impact on both expected wages and hours of the ﬁrm. Taking logs in (4’)
and subtracting the log of aggregate demand for total hours results in the following expression for
the relative demand for hours in the i-th ﬁrm
hdt (i)− ht = −nt(i)− θp1−α Pt(i)− zt(i), (D2)
where zt(i) = zt(i) − zt. The labor-clearing relative nominal wage, Wt(i), would also incorporatezt(i) from a log-linear approximation to (6’) that gives
Wt(i) = − θpθw(1−α) Pt(i)− θ−1w zt(i). (D3)
Both (D2) and (D3) can be written for period t+ 1 and substituted in (D1) to obtain
−Etnt+1(i)− (1+θ−1w )θp1−α Et Pt+1(i)− (1 + θ−1w )ρzzt(i) +Etht+1 +Et wt+1 =
1+ρ
ρ+s

c1vt(i)− qt −Etβt+1− 1−sρ+s [c1Etvt+1(i)−Etqt+1] , (D4)
where ρz is the coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of the AR(1) technology shocks. Using in (D4), vt(i) =
1
s(1−ξ) (nt+1(i) + nt+1) − 1−ss(1−ξ) (nt(i) + nt) − (1−s)ξs(1−ξ)ut, (already derived in Appendix B), and the
corresponding expression for vt+1(i) yields
−

1 + (1+ρ)c1(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s

Etnt+1(i) + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt(i) + (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2(i) =
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 − (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt − (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2 + (1+θ−1w )θp1−α Et Pt+1(i) + (1 + θ−1w )ρzzt(i)
−Etht+1 −Et wt+1 − (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1 − (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt + (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1. (D5)
The relationship between ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment, ﬁrm-speciﬁc prices and ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology
shocks is assumed to be of this type
nt+1(i) = τ1nt(i)− τ2 Pt(i) + τ3zt(i). (D6)
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Using (D6) to infer Etnt+2(i), it is obtained
Etnt+2(i) = τ1nt+1(i)− τ2Et Pt+1(i) + τ3ρzzt(i),
which after being plugged in (D5) results in
−

1 + (1+ρ)c1(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s − τ 1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

Etnt+1(i) + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt(i) =
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 − (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt − (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2 +  (1+θ−1w )θp1−α + τ2 (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Et Pt+1(i)
+

(1 + θ−1w )− τ3 (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s

ρzzt(i)−Etht+1−Et wt+1− (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1− (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt+ (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1.
(D7)
The optimal price is ﬁrm-speciﬁc (and therefore it needs aggregation for computing the average) due
to diﬀerent technology shocks received at each ﬁrm. In particular, it is initially assumed that relative
optimal pricing is negatively relative to technology shocks through their impact on wages (see D3)
and marginal costs P ∗t (i) = P ∗t − τ4zt(i), (D8)
which implies that the relative optimal price expected for next period is Et P ∗t+1(i) = Et P ∗t+1 −
τ4ρzzt(i) and the expected relative price Et Pt+1(i) that appears in (D7) is
Et Pt+1(i) = η (logPt(i)−Et logPt+1) + (1− η)Et P ∗t+1(i) =
η
 Pt(i)−Etπt+1+ (1− η)Et P ∗t+1 − τ4ρzzt(i) , (D9)
where Etπt+1 = Et logPt+1 − logPt is expected next period’s inﬂation. Calvo pricing implies P ∗t =
η
1−ηπt and, subsequently, Et
P ∗t+1 = η1−ηEtπt+1 that can be used in (D9) to yield
Et Pt+1(i) = η Pt(i)− τ4ρz(1− η)zt(i),
which it is inserted in (D7) to obtain
−

1 + (1+ρ)c1(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s − τ 1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

Etnt+1(i) + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt(i) =
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 − (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt − (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2 +  (1+θ−1w )θp1−α + τ2 (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Et Pt+1(i)
+

(1 + θ−1w )− τ3 (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s − τ4(1− η)

(1+γ)θp
1−α + τ2
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

ρzzt(i)−Etht+1 −Et wt+1
− (1+ρ)ρ+s Etβt+1 − (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt + (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1. (D10)
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The aggregation of (D10) over the continuum of ﬁrms leads to two interesting results. First, ﬁrm-
speciﬁc employment dynamics are determined by the linear relationship conjectured as (D6) with
the following analytical solutions for the τ1, τ2 and τ3 coeﬃcients
τ1 =
(1+ρ)c1(1−s)
(ρ+s)s
1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
,
τ2 =
η

(1+θ−1w )θp
1−α +τ2
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
, and
τ3 =

τ3
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s +τ4(1−η)

(1+θ−1w )θp
1−α +τ2
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s

−(1+θ−1w )

ρz
1+
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s −τ1
(1−s)c1
(ρ+s)s
.
Secondly, the expression for aggregate employment dynamics is identical to the model with economy-
wide technology shocks
(1+ρ)c1
(ρ+s)s +
(1−s)2c1
(ρ+s)s
 nt+1 = Etht+1 +Et wt+1 + (1+ρ)c1(1−s)(ρ+s)s nt + (1−s)c1(ρ+s)s Etnt+2 (D11)
+ (1+ρ)ρ+s Et
βt+1 + (1+ρ)(1+c1)ρ+s qt − (1−s)(1+c1)ρ+s Etqt+1.
For pricing dynamics with ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shocks, let us recall expression (B12)
P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηk
 Pt+k + ψt+k − θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Pt+k(i)− (1+θ−1w )(1−βη)1−βηρz zt(i). (D12)
and log ﬂuctuations of the relative marginal cost
ψt(i) = Wt(i) + nt(i)− yt(i) + hdt (i),
where I can use (D2), (D3) and the Dixit-Stiglitz curve yt(i) = −θp Pt(i), and later generalize the
result for any t+ k period to reach
ψt+k(i) = −θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Pt+k(i)− (1 + θ−1w )zt+k(i). (D13)
Inserting ψt+k(i) = ψt+k(i)+ ψt+k and (D13) in (D12) and subtracting the log of the aggregate price
level, Pt, on both sides of the equation, I reach
P ∗t (i) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηk
ψt+k − γnt+k(i)− θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Pt+k(i) + k	
x=1
πt+x

− (1+θ−1w )(1−βη)1−βηρz zt(i)
(D14)
The rational expectation of the steam of future relative prices, conditional to optimal pricing in t
and the lack of optimal price adjustments in the future, is Eηt
Pt+k(i) = P ∗t (i) − Et Pt+k = P ∗t (i) −
40
Pt+ Pt−Et Pt+k = P ∗t (i)−Etkx=1 πt+x = P ∗t (i)−Etjk=1 πt+k. Using this result, (D14) becomes
1 +
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 P ∗t (i) = (1−βη)Eηt ∞	
k=0
βkηk
ψt+k + 1 + θp(θ−1w +α)1−α Et k	
x=1
πt+x

− (1+θ−1w )(1−βη)1−βηρz zt(i).
Recalling the proposed relation for optimal price dynamics, P ∗t (i) = P ∗t − τ4zt(i), the analytical
solutions for τ4 consistent with the last equation is
τ4 =
(1+θ−1w )(1−βη)
(1−βηρz)

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 ,
whereas average optimal prices are
P ∗t = 1− βη
1 +
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
Et
∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k +Et ∞	
k=1
βjηjπt+k. (D15)
Combining (D15) with P ∗t = η1−ηπt from the Calvo scheme leads to
πt =
(1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
Et
∞	
k=0
βkηkψt+k + 1−ηη Et ∞	
k=1
βkηkπt+k,
where one can do πt−βηEtπt+1 to reach the identical New Keynesian Phillips curve to that obtained
in the model with economy-wide technology shocks
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1−βη)(1−η)
η

1+
θp(θ
−1
w +α)
1−α
 ψt.
41
